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Federal Registration Statutes Held To Violate
The Fifth Amendment-Marchetti v. United States,
88 S. Ct. 697 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 88
S. Ct. 709 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 88 S.
Ct. 722 (1968). In three recent opinions, the
Supreme Court held that the self-incrimination
privilege provided a complete defense to federal
prosecutions. In Marchetti and Grosso the defense
was held proper against violations of federal tax
statutes requiring gamblers to register and pay
excise and occupational taxes. In Haynes, the
defense was held proper against a prosecution for
failure to register firearms under Section 5841 of
the Internal Revenue Code. The two former cases
specifically overruled previous Supreme Court
decisions on the subject; United States v. Kahriger,
345 U.S. 22 (1953), and Lewis v. United States,
348 U.S. 419 (1954).
In the Marchetti and Grosso cases, the specific
provisions in issue were part of a statutory tax on
wagers. Sections 4401 and 4411 imposed excise and
occupational taxes. In particular, Section 4412
required that those liable for the occupational
tax register each year with the director of the local
revenue district. The registrant must give "resident
business addresses and must indicate whether they
are engaged in the business of accepting wagers,
and must list the names of their agents and em-
ployees". In addition, registrants were obliged to
post revenue stemps, denoting payment, "con-
spicuously" in their places of business or on their
persons. Finally, they are required to preserve
daily records of the wagers made, which are open
to inspection. Section 4422 declares that the pay-
ment of the wagering taxes is not to "exempt any
person from any penalty provided by a law of the
United States or of any state".
The issue was whether the methods employed,
as shown above, were "consistent with the limita-
tions created by the privilege against self-in-
crimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment".
The Supreme Court said that they were not.
Wagering and its ancillary activities are widely
prohibited under both federal and state laws.
"Evidence of the possession of a federal wagering
tax stamp, or of payment of the wagering taxes,
has often been admitted at trial in state aid federal
prosecutions for gambling offenses. Under these
circumstances, the Supreme Court was unable to
deny that "the obligations to register, and to pay
the occupational tax created for petitioner 'real
and appreciable', and not merely 'imaginary and
unsubstantial' hazards of self-incrimination." The
petitioners' convictions were reversed. The defense
of self-incrimination privilege was held to reach
both the convictions for failure to register and to
pay the occupational tax.
Neither Marchetti nor Grosso holds that the
wagering tax provisions are constitutionally im-
permissible, but only that their validity will de-
pend on an "assessment of the hazards of incrimina-
tion which result from literal and full compliance
with all the statutory requirements." In these two
cases, the statutory obligations were directed al-
most exclusively at individuals "inherently suspect
of criminal activities." Under such circumstances,
the taxpayer was confronted with "substantial
hazards of self-incrimination" and therefore
shielded from the penalties prescribed by the
wagering tax statutes.
In Haynes, the petitioner was charged with
violation of the National Firearms Act. The specific
count averred that the appellant knowingly pos-
sessed a firearm which had not been registered with
the Secretary of the Treasury, as required by
statute. The petitioner moved to dismiss the count,
asserting that the statute violated the Fifth
Amendment since satisfaction of his obligation to
register would have compelled him to provide
information incriminating to himself. The District
Court upheld his conviction, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
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The obligation to register was conditioned simply
upon possession of a firearm within the meaning of
Section 5848. The manufacturer or importer need
not register but all others must "furnish the
Secretary of the Treasury with his name, address,
place where the firearm is usually kept, and the
place of his business or employment. Further, he
must indicate his date of birth, social security
number, and whether he has ever been convicted
of a felony. Finally, he must provide a full descrip-
tion of the firearm." Failure to comply with any
of the Act's requirements was punishable by fine
and imprisonment.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the registra-
tion requirement was "directed principally at
persons who have obtained possession of a firearm
without complying with the Act's other require-
ments, and who therefore are immediately threat-
ened by criminal prosecutions under the Act". As
in Marchetti and Grosso, the registration section of
the Act is aimed primarily at persons "inherently
suspect of criminal activities". The obvious fact
that the failure to register need only precede the
moment at which the accused is charged results in
the great likelihood that a prospective registrant
will be subject to prosecution. Under these circum-
stances, the Supreme Court held that the risks of
criminal prosecution must be termed as real and
appreciable. Petitioner's conviction was reversed.
Comment: These cases do not limit the power
of Congress to tax unlawful activities. However,
the Congressional schemes for enforcing and col-
lecting the tax are open to review. In the above
cases, the methods employed were held unconstitu-
tional.
The dissent in the Marchetti case considered the
harmful effects on society from declaring the regis-
tration sections unconstitutional. Since gambling is
illegal in almost all jurisdictions, gamblers must
necessarily "operate furtively in the dark shadows
of the underworld". The business of gambling is
so clouded with secrecy as to demand some kind
of public disclosure and regulation. The Supreme
Court, by invalidating the registration sections,
is in effect giving to gamblers and the holders of
firearms a "protected shield under which they
can carry out illegal activities". The Supreme
Court seems to have created "a special constitu-
tional privilege of nonregistration" for those
desiring to engage in illegitimate activities.
Whereas Congress has incidentally provided an
aid to law enforcement, the Supreme Court has
used this purpose as an excuse to invalidate the
legitimate Congressional power to collect revenues.
Furthermore, registration schemes are often em-
ployed against legal activities and yet the Supreme
Court has all but closed out their attempted use
for illegal activities. The Fifth Amendment has
therefore done more to hinder law enforcement
agencies than to protect innocent members of
society. However, the protection of our constitu-
tional rights is not to be balanced against the
possible benefits derived from disregarding them
in particular cases. These cases are ideal illustra-
tions of holding as supreme the protection of our
constitutional rights.
Informer Who Testifies At Trial Must Give
True Name-Smith v. Illinois, 88 S.Ct. 748 (1968).
Defendant was convicted for the illegal sale of
narcotics. At defendant's trial the prosecution's
principal witness was a man who identified himself
on direct examination as "James Jordan". This
witness testified that he purchased a bag of heroin
from defendant in a restaurant with marked
money. Defendant's version of the alleged sale was
completely different so that the main question at
the trial was the relative credibility of defendant
and this prosecution witness.
On cross-examination "James Jordan" was
asked if that was his real name, and he responded
that it was not. The witness was then asked what
his correct name was, and the court sustained the
prosecutor's objection to that question. The de-
fense then asked the witness where he lived, and
again the court sustained an objection. Defendant
contends on appeal that the court's rulings on these
objections denied him the right to confront wit-
nesses as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Illinois courts and followed the Sixth Amendment
standard as stated in Alford v. United States, 382
U.S. 687 (1931), and made obligatory upon the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Although the Court
was fully aware that there had not been a complete
denial of the right of cross-examination, it stated
that, "when the credibility of a witness is in issue,
the very starting point in 'exposing falsehood and
bring out the truth' through cross-examination
must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is
and where he lives." Such information, the Court
continued, opens countless avenues of in-court
examination and out-of-court investigation. Quot-
ing from Alford the Court said that "the extent of
cross-examination with respect to an appropriate
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subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of
the trial court", but the court has no obligation to
protect a witness from being discredited on cross-
examination, short of an attempted invasion of his
constitutional protection from self incrimination.
The right of an accused to be confronted with the
witnesses against him is to be determined by the
same standards whether a federal or state proceed-
ing is involved.
Mr. justice Harlan dissented on the ground that
the record raised serious doubt that defendant was
denied any information he did not already have.
He, therefore, argued that the trial court's rulings
were either harmless error or at least made the
issue inappropriate for constitutional adjudication,
and the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as
improvidently granted.
Propriety Of Abstention When Statute Chal-
lenged As Void For Overbreath-Zwickler v.
Kooa, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). The appellant was
convicted in a New York court for violation of a
state statute which made it a crime to distribute,
in quantity, for another person, a handbill con-
taining any statements concerning any candidate
in connection with any election of public officers
unless the handbill also showed the name and
address of the printer and-the person for whom the
handbills were printed. The conviction was first
reversed by the New York Supreme Court and
then affirmed without opinion by the New York
Court of Appeals.
The appellant then sought in the federal district
court a declaratory judgement that the statute
was unconstitutional and injunctive relief against
further criminal prosecutions under it. He invoked
the jurisdiction of the district court through the
Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and the De-
claratory judgement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. He
contended that the statute was repugnant to the
guarantee of free expression in the federal constitu-
tion; that it suffered from "overbreath" because it
covered anonymous handbills both within and
outside of the first amendment protection. The
district court dismissed on the basis of the doctrine
of abstention.
The Supreme Court first considered whether
this dismissal would have been proper if injunctive
relief had not been sought. It argued that the duty
to give due respect to the suitor's choice of a federal
forum for decision of claims arising from the federal
constitution, laws, and treaties has been imposed
on federal courts on all levels. This duty cannot be
escaped on the ground that state courts also have
a duty to protect these rights and thus there is
another forum in which these claims may be ad-
judicated.
The Supreme Court recognized that the district
court properly could have dismissed the action
under special circumstances-if a state court
might have been able to construe the state statute
to avoid or modify the constitutional question.
But it felt there was no way that the question
could be avoided or modified in this case because
of the nature of the claim appellant presented.
The claim that "... a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally sub-
ject to state regulation [has been] achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invades the area of protected freedoms,"
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964),
cannot be modified or avoided by construction of
the statute. The "void for overbreath" claim was
contrasted with that of "void for vagueness"
because a constitutional question of vagueness
might be avoided by a state court decision con-
struing the challenged statute narrowly.
This court reasoned that abstention in cases
similar to the present one could defeat the purpose
of the Civil Rights Act because First Amendment
rights might be "chilled" by the delay of state
court proceedings. Therefore a federal court
should not abstain simply to give the state courts
the first opportunity to vindicate the federal
claim.
The Supreme Court then considered the effect of
the inclusion of a plea for an injunction against
further prosecution under the statute. The district
court had abstained from ruling on the request for
injunctive relief because it felt the appellant had
not shown special circumstances entitling him to
such relief. The Supreme Court agreed that district
courts should hesitate to interfere with threatened
criminal prosecutions in state courts, but argued
that this was not a usual case because of the
declaratory judgement also sought. It held the
district court was wrong in deciding that, since
there were no special circumstances required to
issue an injunction, there were also no special
circumstances which would defeat the application
of the abstention doctrine. The Supreme Court
noted that ". . . the abstention doctrine is inap-
propriate... where ... statutes are justifiably
attacked on their face as abridging free expres-
sion. . ." Downrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
489-490 (1965). It held the federal district court
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had a duty to decide the appropriateness and
merits of a request for a declaratory judgement,
whether or not it concluded the issuance of an
injunction was proper.
Justice Harlan occurred in a separate opinion.
He stated that he was troubled by the opinion if
it was intended to suggest that the appearance of
either an overbreath or a vagueness allegation was
a central factor in determining if abstention is
appropriate. He noted that neither of these terms
has been "definitively delineated" by the Supreme
Court; thus a doctrine based on supposed differ-
ences between these allegations would have no
foundation. He argued that there is no reason to
rule that all cases with allegations of overbreath
are inappropriate for abstention. A district court
could reasonably decide to abstain in a particular
case to prevent friction with state officials or
because a state determination might cause the
federal issues to be presented differently. He also
remarked that such an overbreath-vagueness
standard would reduce the doctrine of abstention
+_ a jiauc o O-+,.
Defense Facility Prohibition Of The Subversive
Activities Control Act Struck Down-United
States v. Robel, 88 S.Ct. 419 (1967). The Govern-
ment appealed a district court dismissal of an
indictment for violation of §5(a)(1)(D) of the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50
U.S.C. 784 (a)(1)(D), which provided that when a
communist action organization is under a final
order to register, it shall be unlawful for any
member of the organization to engage in any
employment in any 'defense facility'. The appellee
Robel had been employed in the shipyard of Todd
Shipyards Corp. for several years when the Secre-
tary of Defense, under authority delegated by
§5(b) of the act, designated it a 'defense facility'.
Shortly thereafter the defendant was indicted.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court
decision on the ground that §5(a)(1)(D) violated
the right of association protected by the First
Amendment. The Court held that here, as in
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964),
"the clarity and preciseness of the provisions in
question makes it impossible to narrow its in-
discriminate cast and overly broad scope without
substantial rewriting". It found this section to cut
indiscriminately across all types of association
without regard to the quality and degree of mem-
bership and thus violate the First Amendment.
The Court rejected the Government contention
that this statute was justified as an exercise of the
war power. The Chief Justice said that the war
power, "can not be invoked as a talismanic incanta-
tion to support any act of congress that can be
brought within its ambit". While the goal of
promoting national defense is valid the Court said
that the means used to achieve it must be measured
against the prohibitions of the First Amendment.
This section was held to establish guilt by associa-
tion alone, without requiring any proof as to the
individual's threat to the nation. The Court held
that the goal desired must be achieved by means
which have a less drastic impact on the con-
tinued vitality of First Amendment freedoms.
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in the result,
prefered to base his decision on what he felt was
an unconstitutional congressional delegation of
authority to the Secretary of Defense, allowing him
wide discretion in deciding what constituted a
'defense facility'. He felt that §5(b) gave the
Secretary too wide a power to decide general policy
questions about national security, without provid-
ing adequate procedural safeguards. The delegation
was, therefore, unconstitutionally vague, especially
since it dealt with fundamental rights protected
under the First Amendment.
Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissented, calling the right of association a "judicial
construct" which should not be considered ab-
solute. In a balancing between national security
and freedom of association, he submitted that he
preferred the Congress' judgment that the de-
fendant's interest in remaining both in his job and
in the party was the less substantial of the two,
since the legislature is in a better position to decide
this type of issue than are the courts.
Right To Counsel In State Probation Revocation
Hearing At Which Deferred Sentence May Be
Imposed-Mempa v. Rhay and Walkling v. Wash-
ington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles,
88 S.Ct. 254 (1967). Petitioners Mempa and
Walkling were convicted of "joyriding" and
burglary in the second degree, respectively, and
were placed on probation. Both were subsequently
brought before the Washington courts and charged
with having breached the conditions of their proba-
tion. Mempa was accused of having been involved
in a burglary and Walkling was accused of having
left the state contrary to the terms of his proba-
tion. Neither had counsel nor was offered court-
appointed counsel at his probation revocation
hearing. At each petitioner's hearing, a probation
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officer testified without cross-examination. No
record was kept of Walkling's hearing. Mempa was
given no opportunity to defend himself. Probation
was revoked in each case and the petitioners were
then sentenced. Both petitioners filed habeas
corpus petitions which the Washington Supreme
Court denied and on which the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court unanimously held that the right to
counsel attaches to state probation revocation
hearings at which a deferred sentence may be
imposed. The right to counsel was recognized in
several special circumstances prior to 1963, includ-
ing one case involving sentencing, Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). In Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court held that
the Sixth Amendment as applied through the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
applicable to the states and, accordingly, that
there was an absolute right to appointment of
counsel in felony cases. Read together, Gdeon and
the previous cases "dearly stand for the proposi-
tion that appointment of counsel for an indigent is
required at every stage of a criminal proceeding
where substantial rights of a criminal accused may
be affected". The fact that the prison board makes
the final determination of the sentence, the court
merely recommending a certain term, does not
alleviate the right to have counsel at the time the
court considers this recommendation. Furthermore,
certain legal rights, such as the right to appeal
from a guilty plea induced by the offer of proba-
tion, might be lost at the probation revocation
hearing if counsel were not present to see that they
were preserved. Therefore, counsel must be present
at such a hearing. The cases were reversed and
remanded.
Comment: This case is one of the few to reach
the Supreme Court on the issue of procedural
rights in a probation revocation proceeding. This
is a cloudy area of the law and the procedures to
be followed have been left to the states and in-
dividual courts. Some hoped that this case might
lead to major constitutional requirements regard-
ing a probationer's procedural rights. These re-
quirements might include a hearing, notice of the
charges, right to counsel, right of indigents to have
court-appointed counsel, right to present evidence
and witnesses, right to cross-examine witnesses,
right of appellate review, etc. At present, most
jurisdictions recognize the right to have retained
counsel present but there is a definite conflict of
authority as to whether the courts are required to
appoint counsel for indigents. Sklar, Law and
Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hear-
ings, 55 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964). But Mr.
Justice Marshall confined his opinion to the
sentencing issue, that is, probation revocation
proceedings at which a deferred sentence may be
imposed. The arguments as reported at 2 Crim.
L. Rep. 2036 (1967) indicate that the Court wished
to proceed cautiously.
Prior Convictions Obtained When Defend-
ant Did Not Have Counsel Are Not Admis-
sible Under Recidivist Statute-Burgett v. Texas,
88 S.Ct. 258 (1967). Defendant was convicted of
"assault with malice aforethought with intent to
murder, repetition of offense," and was sentenced
to ten years in the state penitentiary. In the
indictment the state first alleged the facts upon
which the assault charge was based. Then pursuant
to the Texas recidivist statutes, the indictment
further alleged that the defendant had been
convicted of four previous felonies, once in Texas
for burglary and three times in Tennessee for
forgery. Under the statute defendant would have
been sentenced to life imprisonment if the three
prior felony convictions had been proven. The
prosecution read the entire indictment to the jury
at the beginning of the trial and over objection
introduced evidence regarding the burglary and
two of the forgery convictions. At the end of the
trial the court decided that the convictions were
voided by the defendant's lack of counsel and
instructed the jury not to consider the prior
offenses for any purpose whatsoever in arriving at
the verdict. The Texas appellate court upheld the
convictions. Since the defendant had not suffered
the enhanced punishment provided by the recid-
ivist statute, and since instructions had been given
to disregard the previous convictions, it felt that
no error was presented.
The Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed the convictions. The majority held that the
introduction into evidence of the prior convictions,
obtained without providing counsel for the de-
fendant, violated the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963). Here the defendant was made
to suffer once again for the deprivation of his Sixth
Amendment right. The Court stated that the
certified records of the Tennessee convictions
raised the presumption that the defendant had
been denied the right to counsel in those proceed-
ings since a valid waiver cannot be presumed from
a silent record. Furthermore, the Court found that
19681
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the introduction of these improper convictions for
the purpose of enhancing punishment was in-
herently prejudicial and the majority was unable to
state that the instructions to disregard them made
the constitutional error harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt.
Chief Justice Warren in a concurring opinion
viewed the decision as a laudable limitation of
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) in which the
Court had upheld this state procedure of introduc-
ing past convictions into evidence in order to in-
crease punishment.
In a terse dissent justice Harlan, joined by
Justices Black and White stated the view that the
convictions should be upheld because the error
had been corrected by the trial judge's instruction
to disregard the prior convictions.
Statements Of An Informer As The Basis Of
Probable Cause-Spinelli v. United States, 382
F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967). Appellant Spinelli was
convicted of interstate travel in aid of racketering.
The judgment was reversed on the grounds that
Spinelli had standing to object to the search of an
apartment he was not actually occupying and that
the affidavit in support of the search warrant did
not establish probable cause. The court ordered a
rehearing on the petition of the government.
Spinelli objected to the rehearing as a violation of
his constitutional protection against double
jeopardy. The majority rejected this argument on
the basis that since no mandate issued in this case,
the court retained jurisdiction over the cause and
could thus rehear and, if necessary, modify its
decisions.
The search warrant complained of was obtained
on the basis of an affidavit which recited some
instances where Spinelli traveled from East St.
Louis, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri. It also
stated Spinelli visited a certain apartment each
day, that this apartment was known to contain two
telephones, that Spinelli was known to the affiant
and local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker
and gambler, and that a reliable informant told
the FBI Spinelli was using the telephones in the
apartment to take bets.
Upon rehearing, the court held Spinelli had
standing to object to the search of the apartment.
It reasoned that a person aggrieved by a search
has standing to object to it. Since the Fourth
Amendment is designed to protect privacy, a
person can show he was aggrieved by showing his
privacy was invaded. Even though the individual
was not present when the premises were searched,
if that individual has a legal right to occupy the
premises or is legally occupying them, his personal
privacy has been invaded. The court found
Spinelli's right to be on the premises was estab-
lished by statements in the affidavit that he used
the apartment, by the fact that Spinelli had been
alone in the apartment for at least two hours on
the day the search warrant was executed, and by
the fact that he had a key to the apartment when
he was arrested. Since the court found Spinelli had
sufficient interest in the premises to be a person
aggrieved, he was permitted to question the show-
ing of probable cause supporting the search war-
rant.
The majority of the court decided the informa-
tion in the affidavit established probable cause for
the issuance of the search warrant. Spinelli's
conviction was thus affirmed. While admitting
that the individual pieces of information in the
affidavit would not support a warrant, the majority
felt the affidavit as a whole was legally capable of
persuading the commissioner that an illegal act was
being committed in the apartment. The hearsay
evidence which was the core of the affidavit (the
statement that the FBI had been told by a reliable
source that Spinelli was taking bets in the apart-
ment) was reasonably corroborated by other
evidence and thus could serve as the basis for
probable cause. The hearsay evidence was cor-
roborated by information from the telephone
company and by the observations by the agents of
Spinelli's movements. On the basis of United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) the major-
ity argued that the technical requirements for a
constitutional warrant should not be rigidly inter-
preted. The Fourth Amendment was designed to
prevent invasions of privacy under a general
authority. In this case there was no unjustified
intrusion into Spinelli's affairs. Before obtaining
the warrant, agents observed his interstate travel
and investigated his presence in the apartment
where gambling was alleged to take place in order
to substantiate the information received from the
informer.
Two of the judges, while agreeing Spinelli had
standing to object to the search, dissented from the
majority's finding of probable cause and would
consequently have reversed Spinelli's conviction.
They differed from the majority in that they felt
that in order for hearsay to be the basis for prob-
able cause, certain requirements must be met. The
informer must be shown to be reliable, the informa-
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tion must be precise as to time and place, the in-
formation must be based on the informer's personal
knowledge, and the police must have acted
promptly upon receipt of the information. These
judges were more concerned with the technical re-
quirements for a constitutional warrant than the
majority. Because these requirements were not
met, these judges felt the hearsay evidence could
not provide the basis for probable cause.
The minority stated further that the other facts
stated in the affidavit (even if considered with the
informer's statements) did not support a finding of
probable cause. Since there was no showing that
bookmaking was taking place in the apartment,
the facts that Spinelli was observed traveling be-
tween East St. Louis and St. Louis and that he
was observed entering an apartment complex where
there was an apartment containing two phones
were not enough for probable cause. The state-
ment that Spinelli was a known bookmaker was a
factor the commissioner might have considered if
there had been any credible supporting evidence,
but the minority argued there was no such evi-
dence. (In examining the pieces of information in
the affidavit the minority approach differed from
that of the majority in that the minority looked at
each piece individually while the majority looked
at the total picture presented by taking all the
pieces together.)
Cautionary Instructions On The Character Of
An Informer Required-United States v. Griffin,
382 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1967). Griffin was convicted
of violating the narcotics laws on the basis of the
testimony of a paid informer who was an addict.
The informer told narcotics agents that Griffin
offered to supply him with drugs and told him to
contact a Miss Lewis to place an order. Two such
purchases were arranged and made. In both cases
the conversations between Lewis and the informer
were monitored by an agent. Griffin's car was ob-
served in the vicinity of the informer's apartment
about the time each sale took place. Lewis and
-Griffin were indicted for violation of the narcotics
laws and tried jointly. During the trial Lewis
changed her plea to guilty and the judge then told
the jury her case had been disposed of. Only the
informer and three agents testified at the trial of
Giriffin.
Griffin's primary attack on the trial court's
-decision was directed at the failure of the trial
judge to give the jury sua sponte special cautionary
instructions to the effect that the testimony of the
informer was to be reviewed with caution and
carefully weighed. The Appellate court would not
accept the proposition advanced by Griffin that
the testimony of a paid informer who is a narcotics
addict will not be allowed to stand without sub-
stantial corroboration. But it noted the prevailing
rule, as stated in Todd v. United States, 345 F.2d
299 (10th Cir. 1965), that special cautionary
instructions are required where the informer's
testimony is uncorroborated; even where his
testimony is corroborated in critical respects,
careful instructions drawing the attention of the
jury to the character of the informer's testimony
are favored.
The court decided cautionary instructions should
have been given and thus granted a new trial. It
found all the direct evidence of Griffin's participa-
tion in a plot to violate the narcotic laws was
"tainted in critical respects by its source." It recog-
nized the informer's testimony concerning Lewis
was corroborated and thus felt there was danger
that the jury might have transferred the guilt of
Lewis to Griffin on the basis of the common plan
alleged to exist between them. The failure to give a
cautionary instruction was considered plain error-
in spite of the fact that such an instruction was
never requested.
Comment: This decision is unclear on two points.
The court never stated clearly whether or not it
considered the informer's testimony corroborated.
This is the key inquiry under the rule which the
court purports to apply. If the informer's testimony
is corroborated, a cautionary instruction is favored
but not required. If it is not, failure to give such
an instruction is reversible error. Nor did the court
state specifically whether the reversal resulted from
judicial error or the fault of defense counsel.
Consequently it is hard to tell what this court
really decided.
The court apparently felt the informer's testi-
mony was substantiated to some extent, but not
enough to bring it clearly under the part of the
rule concerned with corroborated testimony. The
court also apparently felt that both the trial
judge and defense counsel were at fault. The
attorney should have requested cautionary instruc-
tions. The judge erred in not taking notice on his
own motion of the attorney's failure to request
these instructions when it was (or should have
been) obvious to him that the defense attorney
intended to make this request.
According to this view of the decision, the court
has not really applied the Todd rule but has ex-
1968]
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tended the rule to allow reversal of a lower court
decision because the trial judge failed to correct
what the appellate court considered an obvious
error on the part of the defense attorney.
The entire decision is based on the assumption
that the defense attorney intended to request a
cautionary instruction but forgot. This assumption
is, however, generally unsupported. The court
sought justification for this assumption by pointing
out that Griffin's attorney relied heavily upon the
"tenuous character" of the informer in a motion
for acquittal and in his argument to the jury. But
the same facts could just as easily be used to
support the proposition that the defense attorney
never intended to request this instruction. Since
the trial judge rejected the argument that the
jury should not be allowed to speculate on the
unsubstantiated testimony of an informer when
this argument was advanced as the basis for an
acquittal, the defense attorney might have decided
it was futile to advance this argument in an
attempt to obtain cautionary instructions.
But whether Griffin's attorney actually forgot to
request the instruction or whether he never in-
tended to request it, it is surprising that the court
did not consider the failure to make a seasonable
request a waiver of the right to request such an
instruction. In the same case this court rejected
other attacks on the conviction because it found
these grounds of attack related to "matters occur-
ring during the trial, to which no objection was
interposed at the time. Such failure of seasonable
objections constituted a waiver of these objec-
tions." (p. 824). It is surprising that the failure
to make a seasonable request for a cautionary
instruction was not treated in the same way. If it
is not treated as a waiver, an undesirable change
in the judicial process could result. Appellate
courts might be called upon to consider every jury
instruction actually given and every one which
might have been given by the trial judge. This
would require the appellate courts to examine an
unnecessary number of issues and would allow them
to rule upon the validity of objections and requests
which were never presented to the trial judge.
Stopping For Traffic Violation Does Not Justify
Unlimited Search-State v. Campbell, 235 A.2d 235
(N. J. Super. 1967); People v. Tate, 230 N.E.2d 697
(Ill. 1967). In Campbell, the defendant was con-
victed of possession of lottery slips. The defendant
was stopped for a traffic violation, and when he
could not produce a license or registration for the
car, he was informed he would be locked up for
being an unlicensed driver. Before being put into
the police car, he underwent a customary pat-down
or frisk, at which time the officer felt a bulge. The
officer investigating the bulge found it to be an
envelope. The officer looked into the envelope and
found lottery slips. The defendant contended the
search was unreasonable and the evidence should
have been suppressed. The court, while recognizing
the reasonableness of a pat-down for weapons as
an incident of a traffic arrest, held that such a
frisk should be limited to dangerous weapons to
protect officers, and did not authorize the search
for contraband, evidentiary material or anything
else in absence of reasonable grounds for arrest.
The court in applying the exclusionary rule, said
once the officer ascertained that the defendant did
not possess a weapon, the investigation should
have stopped.
In Tate, the defendant was convicted of gam-
bling. Defendant had been stopped for a traffic viola-
tion and officers noticed an envelope in his pocket.
The defendant told the officers he worked for a
policy wheel and he was arrested. Inside the en-
velope the arresting officers found policy slips.
There was conflicting testimony whether defend-
ant's admission occurred before or after the police
obtained the envelope. The court held that the
envelope itself and belief that it contained policy
slips were subjective and insufficient basis for
search, unless predicated upon objective facts.
The court said the search was not justified merely
because the defendant had been stopped for a
traffic offense. The case was remanded to determine
whether the admission or search of envelope oc-
curred first, for if the admission was first, the
search was valid for police had probable cause that
the envelope contained slips.
Both cases hold that the stopping for a traffic
violation does not justify unlimited search of the
defendant. Search for evidence not connected with
the violation is forbidden, unless there are objec-
tive facts or unusual circumstances that reasonably
might lead the police to believe that the defendant
was involved in some criminal activity apart from
the traffic violation.
Exclusionary Rule Not Applied To Illegal
Searches By Mexican Authorities-Brulay v.
United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967). During
defendant's trial for conspiring to smuggle nar-
cotics into the United States, amphetamine tablets
found in defendant's car were admitted into
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evidence. These tablets were seized in Mexico by
Mexican authorities who search the car without a
warrant. The defendant claimed that the tablets
were the fruits of an illegal search and should not
have been admitted into evidence. The defendant
also assigned error to the failure of Mexican
authorities to take him before a magistrate
The court affirmed the conviction, refusing to
apply the exclusionary rule or the McNabb doctrine
to Mexican officials. The court noted that no
officer of the United States participated in the
seizure or the questioning, and that the Mexican
officials were not acting at the instigation of
United States custom officials. The court held that
neither the Fourth nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ments were directed at Mexican authorities, and
that no prophylactic purpose would be served by
applying the exclusionary rule or the McNabb rule
since they would not alter the police procedures of
the sovereign Nation of Mexico.
The court also rejected defendant's argument
that there was no proof of a crime committed in the
United States and that regardless of what happened
in Mexico, no crime was committed in the United
States for which he could be tried. The court in-
ferred that Congress intended that smuggling
should extend to foreign countries at least as to
citizens of the United States, since smuggling by
its very nature involves foreign countries, and that
the accomplishment of the crime always requires
some action in a foreign country.
Marijuana Smell Gives Reasonable Cause To
Arrest And Search-People v. Barcenas, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 419 (Ct. App. 1967). The issue in this case
was whether defendant had been convicted with
evidence secured through an illegal search and
seizure. An officer of the Los Angeles airport police
had warned an airport ticket agent to be on the
lookout for Cuban aliens who were smuggling
marijuana to New York City. They carried new
leather suitcases which would be overweight.
Subsequently, a man fitting this description ap-
proached the airport ticket agent, purchased a
ticket to New York City, checked in his overweight
luggage (which the agent placed on a conveyor to
the outbound luggage room), and proceeded to the
Waiting area. The agent then called the police
officer and they went to the outbound luggage
room. The officer, who was an expert at detecting,
through his sense of smell, the presence of mari-
juana inside suitcases, smelled marijuana in de-
fendant's suitcase. The agent pointed out the
defendant and the officer arrested him. The officer
then removed three keys from defendant's person
and opened the suitcase, finding bricks of mari-
juana inside.
The officer's expertise at smelling marijuana was
well-established so that there was reasonable cause
to make an arrest. The officer's reliance on the
agent's identification of the defendant was held to
be reasonable. In fact, the court said, the agent
was a disinterested observer whose motives were
not open to question as would be the motives
of the usual type of informer in narcotics cases.
The search and seizure was therefore justified as
incident to a lawful arrest.
Observation Of Motel Room Through Vent
Violated Fourth Amendment-State v. Kent, 432
P.2d 64 (Utah 1967). The defendant appealed from
his conviction for unlawful possession of a narcotic
on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence found in the search
of his premises. The police, suspecting that the
defendant had been involved in some drug store
robberies in which narcotic drugs had been stolen,
obtained consent from the manager of the motel
where the defendant was staying to use the attic as
a hidden vantage point to observe the suspect.
By looking through a vent in the ceiling of the
defendant's bathroom, the police officer could ob-
serve the entire bathroom and parts of the living
room of the unit. No part of the ventilator system
was removed to facilitate the surveillance. The
attic was common to the entire motel and the
police had entered through a stairway in the
manager's office. On the second day of the surveil-
lance, the officer observed the defendant taking
what looked like a 'fix'. He radioed this informa-
tion to other officers stationed outside the motel
who entered the defendant's unit without a search
warrant and arrested him. A search of the unit was
carried out with the help of the officer in the attic
and the narcotics were located.
The defendant contended that the evidence
thus obtained resulted from an unlawful invasion
of his premises and privacy in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The state
claimed that there was no physical trespass or
unlawful entry into the premises of the defendant
since the observation from the attic was available
to everyone and the vent was in no way tampered
with. Since the officer had cause to believe a
felony was being committed, the entry, arrest, and
seizure of the evidence was justified. The court,
citing United States v. Silverman, 365 U.S. 505, 511
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(1961), said that Fourth Amendment rights were
not to be based on the niceties of property or tort
law. Rather the reasonableness of a search de-
pended on the degree of privacy which the de-
fendant enjoyed in the premises. Since the Fourth
Amendment applied to rented and leased premises,
the defendant had a right to maintain his place of
abode free from outside intrusion and observation.
Since the evidence was obtained illegally by means
of an exploratory search which violated the de-
fendant's right of privacy, the trial court should
have granted defendant's motion to suppress.
The strong dissent argued that the element of
physical trespass was still necessary to make a
search unreasonable. When an officer observed a
crime from a place where he had a legal right to be,
any evidence obtained by such a search ought to be
admitted.
Protective Custody Search Violated Fourth
Amendment-Kleinbart v. State, 234 A.2d 288
(Md.Ct.Spec.App., 1967). A state trooper noticed
the highly erratic driving of defendant Mullin and
charged her with driving "under the influence."
Defendant Kleinbart, her passenger, was charged
with public intoxication, and both were taken to a
police station. Mullin was charged with driving
under the influence of narcotics when a test showed
she was not intoxicated. Kleinbart was sent to a
hospital. The car Mullin had been driving was
owned by her sister; Mullin had been given permis-
sion to use it. When Mullin was originally charged,
the car was towed to a service station, locked, and
parked in a brightly lit area in front of the station.
Some time after Mullin was charged a trooper
went to the car and removed various articles from
it. The officer testified he did this to protect the
property and that as he removed these article he
suspected they might have been stolen because he
saw a man's name other than Kleinbart's engraved
on a watch.
Kleinbart voluntarily returned to the station at
the request of a trooper. At this time there was no
knowledge that a crime had been committed and
Kleinbart was not arrested. Kleinbart told the
officers he knew nothing about the property and
that it was not to his knowledge stolen. Calls were
made to some people whose names appeared on the
property. One of these people reported his apart-
ment had been broken into. He accompanied a
trooper to the service station where the car was
parked. As the officer finished "cleaning out" the
car, this man identified several articles in the car
as taken from his apartment. Kleinbart and Mullin
were charged with and convicted of grand larceny.
The defendants contended that the searches of
the automobile and the seizure of articles found
in it were too remote in time and place to be sup-
ported as incident to the arrest. The state argued
that the articles were originally taken into protec-
tive custody only and that the property was not
seized until the officers knew that an apartment
had been ransacked and until Kleinbart had
denied knowledge of the property.
Defendants relied upon Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364 (1964) in support of their position. In
Preston the Supreme Court noted that contempor-
aneous searches are designed to allow seizure of
weapons and other things which might be used to
assault an officer or effect an escape and to prevent
destruction of evidence of a crime. The Supreme
Court also noted these justifications are present
only when the search is not too remote from the
crime. This court accepted the "remoteness" test
and found the searches too remote because they
were made one and one-half and seven hours after
both defendants were arrested and the car towed
to the service station.
The state urged that Preston was inapplicable
and that this case should be decided under the
rationale of Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967),
where a warrantless search and seizure was upheld
even though made a week after the arrest. This
court felt Cooper was inapplicable because it dealt
with narcotics and thus the search could not be
attacked on the basis of remoteness. According to
California law, a car used in the illegal transport of
narcotics is subject to forfeiture. Thus the police
are required to seize the car and hold it as evidence
until the forfeiture proceedings are completed.
Under these circumstances, the search of the car
was considered reasonable in Cooper.
This court also rejected the "protective custody"
argument. While it recognized there are situations
in which the police may appropriately take articles
into protective custody, it felt the present case
was not in this category. St. Clair v. State, 232 A.2d
565, (Md. 1967) was noted as an example of a
situation where the protective custody argument
would be accepted. In that case articles removed
from a car without a warrant four days after the
owner was arrested for an unrelated offense were
admitted into evidence in a prosecution for break-
ing and entering-even though these articles were




This court felt the factors which prompted the
St. Clair court to accept the protective custody
argument were not present here. Defendants were
charged with crimes for which they were entitled
either to immediate hearings or release upon giving
bond; St. Clair was to be held for the authorities
of another state. This car was locked and parked
in a well-lighted area; St. Clair's car was parked
near the jail and had one door which would not
lock. This court also noted that the trial judge in
St. Clair made a finding of fact that the sole pur-
pose of the police in listing St. Clair's property was
to preserve it against loss; the trial judge in the
present case made no such finding.
Deciding further that both defendants had
standing to object to the introduction of the
evidence obtained as a result of these unreasonable
searches and seizures, the court reversed the lower
decision and remanded the case for a new trial.
Mullin was found to have standing to object be-
cause she was in possession of the car (with the
permission of the owner) at the time of her arrest.
Kleinbart was considered to have standing to ob-
ject because he had been a passenger immediately
before his arrest and thus could not help being
identified with the contents of the automobile.
The court felt that should he not be allowed stand-
ing to object he would be ". . . subjected to the
penalties meted out to one in lawless possession
while refused the remedy designed for one in that
situation." (p.303). The court followed the
principle that the object of the Fourth Amendment
is the protection of privacy and thus did not re-
quire that Kleinbart show a superior possessory
interest in the articles seized, since under the
circumstances, his presence in the automobile gave
him standing to object.
. Warrantless Search Incidental To Arrest For
Traffic Violation Inadmissible-Gridstrom v.
Beto, 273 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Tex., 1967). Defend-
ant applied for a writ of habeas corpus following
conviction for armed robbery. He contended that
the stolen money and a gun, hidden in a car, seized
by a police officer without a warrant, was inad-
missible under the Fourth Amendment. The de-
fendant and the driver were stopped four miles
from the scene of the robbery, and the driver failed
to produce his license when ordered by the police
officer. After placing the defendant and the com-
panion in a police car, the officer tore out the kick-
board beneath the glove compartment and found
the evidence. The district court ruled the search
violative of the Fourth Amendment, and granted
the writ.
The State claimed that while a warrantless
search is held unreasonable without evidence of its
reasonableness, the search here was incident to the
arrest for driving without a license and therefore
lawful. The court explained, however, that al-
though a search incident to an arrest might be
reasonable, the search must bear a relation to the
crime investigated and charged. Here, the court
said, "The search of the interior of a motor vehicle
bears no relation to seeking the means by which a
traffic offense was committed".
The court also rejected the argument that the
officer's search was justified since he had reason
to believe he was in danger or that the defendant
was armed. Both the defendant and companion
were guarded while they sat in the police car.
Further, the police officer did not have probable
cause to suspect that defendant was guilty of the
robbery. The testimony revealed nothing that
would indicate the officer had suspected the defend-
ant; there was no evidence upon which a magis-
trate would have issued a search warrant.
It was also held that the defendant did have
standing to object to the search even though he
was not the owner of the car. The court said that
"... the only requisites for standing are legitimate
presence by an individual [at the scene of the
search] and the attempted use against him of the
evidence wrongfully obtained".
Personal Service of Search Warrant Required
For Search of Defendant's Truck-Boyd v. State,
204 So.2d 165 (Miss. 1967). Defendant was con-
victed for the illegal possession of drugs found in
his parked pick-up truck by police detectives.
These detectives followed the defendant's wife,
who had possession of packages of stolen drugs, and
witnessed her give the packages to an unidentified
man in the parking lot where defendant's truck
was located. The detectives later appeared before
a Justice of the Peace, testified by way of affidavit
that they believed the drugs to be stored in de-
fendant's truck, and received a search warrant.
Without first apprehending the defendant and
serving him with the warrant, the detectives
seized the goods from the truck. The defendant,
who was subsequently arrested, was nearby at the
time of the search and could have easily been
found.
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the
conviction and discharged the defendant holding
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that it was improper for the detectives to search
the truck without first serving the warrant upon
the defendant especially since such service could
have been easily obtained. The issue of personal
service was not argued in the briefs on appeal.
The court concluded that without the evidence
of the packages found in the truck, there were no
grounds upon which the conviction could be upheld
since there were no facts from which defendant's
knowledge of the illegal possession could be in-
ferred, and therefore discharged the defendant.
Speeding Conviction Based On Radar Device Is
Reversed-Biesser v. Town of Holland, 156 S.E.2d
792 (Va. 1967). Defendant was found guilty of
speeding. At the trial he was accused of operating
his automobile at 48 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone
on the basis of a radar check by the arresting offi-
cer. Also, this policeman testified that he could not
estimate the speed of the defendant's motor vehicle
by any other means except the radar. Virginia law
provides that the results of radar checks shall be
accepted as prima facie evidence of speed when
speed is at issue.
On appeal the state supreme court reversed.
Noting that its prior decisions require that the
Commonwealth prove that the device used for
measuring speed had been properly set up and
tested for accuracy, the court felt that the police
had not met their burden in this case. Over objec-
tion, the arresting officer testified that he tested
the reliability of the radar unit by means of a cali-
brated tuning fork. He further testified that the
calibration was checked and found to be accurate
by a member of another police force whose name
he did not know. The court held that the accuracy
of the device was not established since there was
no evidence as to how the tuning fork was used.
Nor was any evidence offered as to its reliability
except for this inadmissible hearsay given by the
police officer.
Defining Custody For The Application Of The
Miranda Rule-Morgan v. State, 234 A.2d 762
(Md., 1967); State v. Williams, 432 P.2d 679 (Ore.
1967). The issue in these two cases was when was
the accused in police "custody", thus requiring that
he be advised of the constitutional protections
afforded him by Miranda v. State, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). In the Morgan case, the principles of
Miranda were held inapplicable to what the defend-
ants did and said while he was not in an "arrest
status." In the Williams case, the defendant was
held to have been in police custody and evidence
obtained before the defendant was informed of his
constitutional rights was held inadmissible.
In Morgan, the defendant was not arrested or in
"custody" when the, officers drove alongside the
appellant and stated their belief that the men had
taken narcotics at a nearby gas station. The
Morgan court considered it well-established that
"when one is approached by a police officer and
merely questioned as to his identity and actions,
this is only an accosting and not an arrest". Such
questioning does not necessitate advising the de-
fendant of his constitutional rights under Miranda.
Moreover, Miranda does not require that the police
advise "an accosted suspect that he need not
submit to a search or that, if he does, that the fruits
thereof may be used as evidence against him". The
Morgan court did not feel that the arrest had taken
place till after the officers had seen the narcotic
paraphernalia, and, then, "the police had probable
cause to arrest for felony of possession of
narcotics".
In State v. Williams, the evidence was obtained
after the defendants were in police "custody". The
defendants, aged 19 and 17, were employed at a
recently burglarized Co-op. They quit and left
town soon after the burglary took place. The boys
were sought for questioning, and upon being found,
gave false identifications. At this point, the sheriff
took the boys in "custody" by requesting them to
accompany him to the police station on "runaway
minor" and "vagrancy" charges.
An interrogation followed which led to the dis-
closure of a bus station locker which contained the
"fruits of the crime." The defendants were then
apprised of their constitutional rights and confessed
soon thereafter. The police contended that the
Miranda warning was not necessary till the defend-
ants were the focal suspects of the burglary. The
court held that pre-interrogation warning by the
police was necessary to protect the defendants'
Fifth Amendment rights not to be witnesses against
themselves. The decision on appeal was that the
trial court's admitting the evidence of the stolen
goods and admitting defendants' confessions ob-
tained upon further interrogation after police dis-
covered the stolen goods was error.
Comment: The Miranda rule is aimed at coercive
police practices. The Williams and Morgan courts
distinguish between coercive and noncoercive
police practices by looking for an actual arrest
and "custodianship" of the defendant. This dis-
tinction fails to accommodate the coercive atmos-
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phere present in a situation like the one found in
Morgan. Though the defendants there were not
technically under arrest, they were certainly not
free to leave without answering the questions
posed to them.
When the defendants in Morgan were asked to
pull off the road to answer questions, they were as
much within police custody as if they were in the
traditionally coercive atmosphere of the police sta-
tion. They were deprived of their freedom of action
in the very same sense as that which the Williams
court held to require the Miranda warning. They
could not run. They were bound to answer or sub-
mit to an arrest. The distinction fails to convince
one of the self-definable characteristic of the con-
cept of "custody." Police custody seems just as
applicable to the Morgan situation as to the Wil-
liams case. Once the police have deprived a suspect
of his freedom of action, he should be apprised of
his constitutional rights under Miranda. Physical
and psychological pressures can be administered
on suspects just as easily in the Morgan case as in
Williams.
Since protection from potential police abuse was
the goal sought by Miranda, the definition of cus-
tody should be given a scope more appropriate to
the attainment of this goal. This definition should
be extended to include police interrogations which
are intended to provide evidence for future convic-
tions. In the Morgan case, it can be seen quite
clearly that the police had every intention of arrest-
ing the suspected narcotics. Deprivation of freedom
of action should be the key. Such deprivation
occurred in Morgan as soon as the defendants were
asked to pull over.
Arrest Status Based On Officer's Intent And
Freedom To Leave-State v. Williams, 235 A.2d
684 (N.J., Cty. Ct. 1967). Defendant was indicted
for murder, rape, robbery and assault, and at trial
he moved to suppress certain evidence including a
deposit plate and a charge plate issued to one of the
victims and $91 in currency.
Shortly after the crimes took place six to eight
possible suspects' names emerged, including de-
fendant's, as being potential leads. Two detectives
were assigned to pick up defendant, and they lo-
cated him the morning after the crimes at a local
bar. Upon being asked by one of the detectives to
come along to headquarters, defendant inquired
as to whether he was going to be locked up. The
detective replied, "No, you are not under arrest,
I only want to talk to you". Defendant then volun-
tarily entered the police car and was driven to
police headquarters. Upon arrival he was taken to
the detective room whereupon he was asked to
empty his pockets and whether he had any money
on him. After defendant put 550 on the desk he was
asked whether he had any more. Defendant replied,
"I have" and proceeded to take a wallet from his
pocket and throw it on the desk. The force of the
throw caused the deposit plate and charge plate,
upon which one of the victim's name appeared, to
fall in open view on the desk. Defendant was then
placed under formal arrest.
Defendant argued that he was arrested without
probable cause prior to the formal arrest, and,
therefore, the search for and seizure of the items
sought to be suppressed, not being incidental to a
valid arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures and
required suppression of the evidence so seized.
In denying defendant's motion the court held
that defendant was not under arrest until after
throwing the wallet down. Based on the testimony
of the police officers involved, the court found that
from the moment defendant was approached in the
bar until the moment of his formal arrest at police
headquarters he could have voluntarily left the
presence of the police and was not in custody or
under any restraint, and thus not under arrest. One
criterion of an arrest is some physical restraint or a
strong apprehension of restraint reasonably ar-
roused in the suspect's mind. The court conceded
that defendant might argue that it would have been
unreasonable for him to consider himself as any-
thing but arrested but it pointed out that no proof
of this state of mind was adduced. Furthermore, an
arrest also involves the officer's state of mind, and
a suspect may feel detained or actually be detained
and yet not arrested in the legal sense at all. The
court also found that defendant's voluntary entry
into the police car was no indication of arrest nor
was the defendant under constructive or actual
arrest merely because he was in the confines of the
police headquarters.
Focusing upon the request made for defendant to
empty his pockets, the court concluded that this
was to make sure defendant had no concealed
weapons as he had not been previously searched
and was entirely reasonable during the investiga-
tory detention period to protect the police.
Based upon the reasoning described and upon
the further ground that defendant's revelatory
action was a product of his free will and not police
duress, the court held that all the items in evidence
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were taken incidental to the lawful formal arrest
and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The court therefore disposed of defendant's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment arguments. Defend-
ant's money and wallet were not produced pur-
suant to a custodial interrogation to which
Miranda applies, and, furthermore, defendant's
acts of throwing the money and wallet on the desk
were not evidence of a testimonial or communica-
tive nature which is all the Fifth Amendment
protects against. Finally, the court said that the
search and seizure here was not a "critical stage"
in the criminal process at which counsel is required
under the Sixth Amendment.
Right to Speedy Trial Violated by Denial of De-
fendant's Motion to Appear As His Own Counsel-
People v. Addison, 63 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Ct. App.
1967). Defendant was charged with grand theft,
and a public defender was appointed to represent
him. The deputy public defender asked the trial
court for a twenty day continuance because the
appointed defender was ill. The defendant then
moved the court to allow him to try his own case.
The court questioned him on his knowledge of the
law and his ability to handle effectively the pro-
cedural aspects of the case. After the interrogation,
the court denied the defendant's motion and
allowed the continuance. Following the subsequent
trial, defendant was convicted.
He appealed alleging that the granting of the
continuance was a violation of his right to a speedy
trial as guaranteed in California by statute. The
Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and
remanded with instructions to dismiss. According
to the court's interpretation of the statute, a trial
may be postponed for cause. The court reasoned
that the defendant's motion to proceed in propria
persona was erroneously disallowed, and thus the
statutory requirement of cause for a trial continu-
ance was not met. Therefore, the defendant had
been denied his right to a speedy trial, and the
court dismissed the charge.
Defendant's Shoe Type Aids Finding Of Proba-
ble Cause-Sterling v. State, 235 A.2d 711 (Md.
Ct. App. 1967). Defendant was found guilty of
rape, and the trial court sentenced him to death.
The evidence of his guilt was clear and free from
doubt. Defendant contended, however, that the
seizure of his clothing and the taking of his finger
and palm prints were the fruits of an illegal search
and thus inadmissible in evidence because the
search was incident to an unlawful arrest. The
question before the court, therefore, was whether
there had existed probable cause for arrest without
a warrant.
The rape was perpetrated late at night, and the
following morning officers traced footprints leading
to and from the window, through which the in-
truder had gained entrance, to within a short dis-
tance of the defendant's home. Prior to defendant's
arrest one of the arresting officers was aware, from
his examination of a footprint in the mud, that
they were to look for a shoe with a crepe sole and
finely woven cloth top. Upon locating defendant
the officers testified that they "made certain ob-
servations" and took him into custody because he
was wearing "the type of shoe [they were] looking
for". After his arrest defendant was placed in the
police car, and his shoes were removed. He was
then taken to the victim's home "where his left
shoe, after being matched to the footprint in the
mud puddle, was determined to be similar". There-
after defendant's home was searched, and he was
fingerprinted and palmprinted.
In affirming the trial court's judgment the court
of appeals held that the officers did have probable
cause to arrest defendant. At the time defendant
was taken into custody the police knew the man
who assailed the woman was a Negro, stammered
when he talked, had been wearing a certain kind of
shoe and that footprints extended from the home
of the victim and disappeared within a short dis-
tance of defendant's home. The court, quoting
from Farrow v. State, 197 A.2d 434 (1964), went on
to say that, although the record did not specifically
indicate what was said by the victim when the
police first arrived at her home, there would be a
fair inference that she told them what she knew
about the crime and identity of her assailant. All
that is necessary for there to be probable cause to,
arrest is reasonable grounds for belief of guilt which
requires less evidence than would justify convic-
tion but more than a mere suspicion.
Confession Closely Following Morgue Viewing
Held Involuntary As a Matter Of Law-McKinley
v. State, 154 N.W.2d 344 (Wis. 1967). During de-
fendant's trial on a second degree murder charge
the state proposed to offer in evidence three verbal
confessions and one written confession given to the
police by defendant as a result of interrogations.
After a hearing in the absence of the jury to deter-
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mine voluntariness all four statements were ad-
mitted in evidence, and the jury subsequently
returned a guilty verdict.
Defendant's first oral admission was made to
officers after questioning at the scene of the murder.
The second was made during an hour and one-half
interrogation at the police station where defendant
had been immediately taken. Fifteen minutes later
defendant was taken by two detectives to the
county morgue allegedly to identify the victim.
Immediately after this viewing she was taken back
to the station, questioned and again orally con-
fessed. The next morning defendant was again
taken to the morgue by two different detectives
for identification purposes. Although the evidence
was not clear as to how much of the victim's body
defendant was shown, it was established that an
autopsy had been performed earlier that same
morning. Subsequent to this second viewing de-
fendant was questioned and signed a written con-
fession. Prior to all four statements Miranda
warnings were given, and the trial court found all
the confessions voluntary and free of psychological
coercion.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the
conviction and the order denying a new trial and
remanded for further proceedings. The court found
identification of the victim unnecessary because
there had been adequate identification by the de-
ceased's two sisters. The court held the last two of
defendant's four confessions inadmissible, noting
that those two confessions were made an hour and
one-half and forty minutes respectively after a
viewing at the morgue stating:
We deem that where the confession follows the
morgue viewing as closely in time as occurred
here it should be held as a matter of law that
the confession is the result of such psychologi-
cal pressure as to render the same involuntary.
(Emphasis added).
The court ordered a new trial even though the
first two confessions were voluntary and admissible
because of the United States Supreme Court hold-
ings in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
and Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), that a
state's harmless-error rule cannot be applied to a
confession obtained in denial of due process. In
Payne the Court held that admission in evidence,
over objection, of a coerced confession will always
vitiate a judgment and is such a constitutional
error which can never be held to be harmless.
National Standards Should Be Used To Deter-
mine Obscenity-Htdson v. United States, 234
A.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Defendants were con-
victed of staging obscene shows. On appeal they
urged that the government's failure to introduce
evidence to prove contemporary community
standards in the nation as a whole was reversible
error. The court of appeals agreed.
The court applied the test of obscenity first enun-
dated in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957):
whether to the average person applying contem-
porary community standards the dominant theme
of the material appeals to the prurient interest. It
then ruled that "contemporary community stand-
ards" should be determined by reference to a
national norm and not by the customs of the local
community. The court was concerned lest under
a national Constitution entertainment permissible
in one locale should be denied to the residents of a
neighboring one. Then it was held that unless the
production was patently obscene, twelve local
jurors were not capable of determining the stand-
ards of tolerance prevelant in the nation generally
without being given some competent evidence of
what those standards are. The court reasoned that
under the constitutional test "A guilty verdict in
an obscenity trial should not be a legal expression
of revulsion by the local community from which
the jury is drawn." Thus the government by not
offering proof of the national standards, failed to
establish an essential element of the crime charged.
Chief judge Hood dissented on two grounds.
First, he contended that a local community stand-
ard should govern and therefore the jury was as
well qualified to determine this question as any
expert. Secondly, he did not feel that this burlesque
show was entitled to constitutional protections
afforded speech and expression. He felt that this
show consisted almost entirely of conduct and was
not a true expression of ideas, and so did not fall
within the purview of the First Amendment. Thus
he wrote: "I conclude that while all may agree
that an artist may paint and exhibit a portrait of a
nude, the artist has no constitutional right to walk
down the street in the nude."
Comment: The courts are not in agreement as to
whether local or national standards should be ap-
plied to such live performances. For the contrary
view that local standards should apply, see Newark
v. Hunphres, 228 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. 1967).
Nudist Magazine Held Not Obscene-People
v. Noroff, 433 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1967). Defendants
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were charged with violation of a statute which
proscribes the possession of obscene material for
distribution. The trial judge, after examining in
chambers the challenged publication, a single copy
of International Nudist Sun, ruled that it was not
obscene and thus entitled to the constitutional
protection of the First Amendment. The appellate
court reversed this decision, but the Supreme Court
of California agreed with the trial judge that this
material was not obscene.
The supreme court noted that the magazine did
explicitly depict male and female genitalia. But
because most of these pictures portrayed entirely
innocuous outdoor activities and none displayed
any type of sexual activity, the court found they
did not satisfy the test of obscenity laid down by
the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The court felt that the
dominant theme of the magazine taken as a whole
did not appeal to the prurient interest. As a conse-
quence the court declared that since the publica-
tion was not obscene in any event, the fact that it
was utterly devoid of redeeming social value was
of no importance. Furthermore, the California
court emphasized that its decision is compelled by
recent United States Supreme Court decisions
holding similar magazines not obscene e.g. Central
Magazine Sales Ltd. v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 235
(1967).
The dissent strongly urged that not only did the
publication lack redeeming social value, but also
that there was a prurient emphasis on genitalia
which rendered the magazines obscene.
Comment: This case is in accord with the general
trend of decisions holding that nudity alone, with-
out lewdness, is not obscene. See e.g. People v.
Biotic, 224 N.E.2d 572 (Ill. App. 1967).
Search And Seizure Of Allegedly Obscene
Materials Held Invalid-United States v. Brown,
274 F.Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y., 1967). The defendant
made a motion under Rule 41(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure directing return of
419 cartons of magazines seized by the F.B.I. pur-
suant to a search warrant. These magazines,
located on the defendant's business premises, were
thought to be obscene and "fruits of the crime of
transporting obscene material in interstate com-
merce". These materials, however, were never
examined by the magistrate who issued the war-
rant. The district court granted the defendant's
motion, holding that materials which may be pro-
tected by the First Amendment freedoms cannot
be seized until the defendant has been allowed a
hearing before the magistrate.
Moreover, the court noted that of the 419 car-
tons seized, the contents of only three were exam-
ined before the issuance of the warrant. Further,
even though the warrant ordered the seizure of
only sixteen cartons, 419 were actually taken.
Thus, not only was there a violation of the Fourth
Amendment in the issuance of the warrant without
a hearing, but also a violation of the terms of the
warrant by the F.B.I. in seizing 403 cartons not
mentioned in the warrant.
The court also determined that the defendant
had standing to assert his rights under the Fourth
Amendment since he was the "person aggrieved"
by the search as stated in Rule 41(e). Such person
must have ... . a recognizable interest in the
property seized or the premises searched". The
court relied on the recent decision of United States
v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967), which
ruled that a vice president of a union has standing
to object to an unreasonable search of the union's
accounts since he was the ".... one against whom
the search was directed, as distinguished from one
who claims prejudice only through the use of evi-
dence garnered as a consequence of a search and
seizure directed at someone else". Thus, the Man-
cusi rule meant that the defendant, the sole owner
of the corporation against whom the search was
conducted, did have standing to object.
Seventh Circuit Adopts ALI Insanity Test-
United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.
1967). The defendant claimed the defense of in-
sanity. The district court defined the defense of
insanity as follows:
'Insane' as used here means such a perverted
and deranged condition of a person's mental
and moral facilities as to render him either
(1) incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong, or incapable of knowing the
nature of his act he is committing; or
(2) where he is conscious of the nature of the
act he is committing and able to distinguish
between right and wrong and knows that the
act is wrong, yet his will, by which I mean the
governing power of his mind has been so com-
pletely destroyed that his actions are not sub-
ject to it, but are beyond his control.
In rejecting this definition, the appellate court
reasoned that the function of a definition of the
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defense of insanity is to aid the jury in deciding
whether an accused who is mentally ill was at the
time of engaging in the offensive conduct, domi-
nated or affected by his mental illness to so sub-
stantial a degree that society cannot in good con-
science hold him responsible for the conduct as a
crime.
The court adopted the following revised Ameri-
can Law Institute definition:
The defendant has interposed insanity as a
defense. The law presumes that a defendant is
sane. This presumption is rebuttable. Where a
defendant introduces some evidence that he
had a mental disease or defect at the time of
the commission of the crime charged, the pros-
ecution must establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not have a men-
tal disease, or defect, or that despite the mental
disease or defect he had [the] substantial capac-
ity both to appreciate the wrongfulness [either
to know the criminality] of his conduct, and [or]
to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law. (Additions are italicized; deletions
are in brackets.)
The test differs from the previous test which re-
quired complete destruction of power of self-con-
trol, whereas this test requires only that the de-
fendant have less than "substantial capacity" to
conform his conduct. The court found this ALI
test better than the Durham test, which the court
felt failed to serve its function when the instruction
must include the proposition that the burden is on
the government to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defense of insanity has not been
established.
The dissent argued that while the courts may
have difficulty in deciding whether the Durham,
M'Naghten, or ALI definition of insanity should be
given, a jury in any given case would reach the same
conclusion, irrespective of which test was given.
Failure Of Court To Order Psychiatric Examina-
tion On Own Motion Not Reversible Error-
People v. Morales, 61 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App.,
1967). Defendant was found guilty of kidnapping,
violations of the California Penal Code sections
proscribing perversion and lewd and lascivious acts
upon the body of a child under 14, and a prior
felony conviction. The judgment was here affirmed
upon appeal.
The facts of this case were disputed. The 13-year-
old complaining witness testified that defendant's
companion forcibly took her into a house where
defendant committed lewd and lascivious acts upon
her body. Another person allegedly present at this
occurrence testified however that he had seen the
complaining witness getting out of a car full of
young men during the time she testified to being in
the house. He further testified that she told him
not to say anything to her father. A third witness
testified that he and the defendant had been in a
bar and then went to his house where the defendant
spent the night. Defendant's testimony agreed with
this. Thus, the jury was confronted with conflicting
testimony as to the defendant's whereabouts at
the time of the alleged criminal acts. It was further
disclosed that the young girl had a prior history as
a juvenile sex offender and that she was somewhat
retarded, being unable to tell time and the name of
the street on which she lived. On the basis of this
evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty of
the criminal acts charged.
The appellate court held that despite the fact
that the prosecutrix's testimony was largely un-
corroborated, the decision to order her to submit to
a psychiatric examination was one entirely within
the discretion of the trial judge. The mere fact that
she is to some degree delinquent and dull witted
will not be sufficient to cause an appellate court to
overrule the trial judge's discretion. Her testimony
need not be corroborated and was not inherently
improbable so as to make the verdict erroneous as
a matter of law. Nor was defendant's counsel in-
competent not to subpoena the medical records of
an examination given the prosecutrix after the
incident because defendant need not have com-
mitted intercourse to have been guilty of the al-
leged crime. Therefore, the medical examination
could not have established defendant's innocence.
Defendant's conviction was therefore affirmed.
Comment: Certain rules have been established
to facilitate proof of sex crimes which might other-
wise go unpunished. But these same rules may lead
to convictions based on evidence which is quite
flimsy. Greater restraint on trial courts than is
shown in this case may be necessary.
Four State Vagrancy Laws Struck Down-
Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass.
1967). The petitions for writs of error brought by
five defendants separately convicted of five offenses
were heard and decided together. All had been
convicted of misdemeanors intended to snare
1968]
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vagrants and others who might be preparing to
commit a crime.
Defendant Mitchell was fined for violating a
statute permitting policemen to examine all persons
abroad (at night) whom they have reason to suspect
of unlawful design and may demand of them their
business and where they are going. Persons who
fail to give a satisfactory account of themselves
may be arrested by the police and taken before a
district court to be examined and prosecuted. The
state argued that this statute does not constitute a
substantive offense but only gives the police the
power to stop, detain and arrest persons under cer-
tain limited circumstances. The court rejected this
view, saying that the statute did attempt to create
a substantive offense. Rather, it accepted the de-
fendant's argument that the statute was unconsti-
tutionally vague, violating both the Massachusetts
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause. The court said that arrest for suspi-
cion is too subjective to provide an intelligible
standard to guide either the suspect or the court.
Moreover, the test of failure to give a satisfactory
account of oneself merely enhances the uncertainty
since it gives too much discretion to the police and
courts.
The court, however, explicity did not overrule a
previous decision, Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196
N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1964), that upheld this statute
in so far as it permits a brief threshold inquiry
where suspicious conduct gives the officer reason to
suspect that the person has committed, is com-
mitting, or is about to commit a crime.
Albert Patch was convicted under a complaint
charging him, among other things, "as being an
idle person with no visible means of support who
has lived without lawful employment". The court
held that the above section of the vagrancy statute
seeks to punish a person because of his status. The
court found that the statute was used against two
types of persons, 1) alcoholic derelicts whose only
crime is idleness and poverty, which should not be
treated as a criminal offense, and 2) persons who
are suspected of criminal conduct. As to these the
court says this statute may not be used to shortcut
due process requirements. This section, therefore,
was held repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment
in that it seeks to make criminal, conduct which
can not be classed as such and is an invalid exercise
of the police power. The court also held that the
section was void for vagueness.
Riley Fido was convicted under a similar statute
that made it a crime to, "rove about from place to
place living without visible means of support".
The court found this provision unconstitutional on
the same grounds as are set forth in the Patch case.
Joseph Alegata, a convicted thief, was convicted
under a complaint which charged that on a certain
day he, "was a person known to be a thief and a
burglar and was then and there acting in a suspi-
cious manner around a store". He received a nine
months sentence. This complaint was based on a
statute making it a misdemeaner for a pickpocket,
thief or burglar to act suspiciously in places that
are, according to the court "so all inclusive as to
embrace about any place where a person would apt
to be present outside his own home". The court
first held that it was an unconstitutional use of the
police power to make commission of crimes in the
past constitute a present offense. The qualifying
phrase, "acting in a suspicious manner" is alto-
gether too vague to turn noncriminal conduct into
an offense.
In the last case the court held that the word
"disorderly" was definite enough to withstand a
charge of vagueness when it was interpreted as
aimed against persons causing a public disturbance
or hazard.
Referral Selling Plan Held To Be A Lottery-M.
Lippincott Mortgage Investment Co. v. Childress,
204 So.2d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). In a suit
on a promissory note the plaintiff, the assignee of
the seller of a central vacuum cleaner system, ap-
pealed a summary judgment that as a matter of
law the note of the defendant buyer was void be-
cause the transaction which formed its basis con-
stituted a lottery.
In affirming the court of appeals did not find it
necessary to decide whether the practices in this
case constituted a lottery as defined by the case
law. Rather, it based its decision on a Florida stat-
ute that makes all chain letters and pyramid clubs,
where fees or anything of value is exchanged, lot-
teries. Any participant in such clubs or anyone who
solicits persons for membership in them is guilty
of a felony.
In the present case the undisputed facts were
that after original contact by a friend who asked
them if they were interested in making some
money, the defendants were approached by Uni-
versal Marketing Research, the assignor of the
plaintiff. The representatives of the seller pre-
sented the defendants with a plan whereby they
could buy the central vacuum cleaning system for
$975.00 and give a promissory note for all but a
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small downpayment. The defendants would also
provide the seller with 16 names of friends who
might be interested in likewise purchasing the
cleaner. For each person of the 16 who bought the
vacuum cleaner, the defendants would receive $50.
Defendants would be treated as agents of the seller
and it was implied that their commissions would be
enough to pay for their vacuum cleaner system and
also make a profit that theoretically would exceed
$7000. The defendants accepted and altogether
earned $200 in commissions.
In deciding that this scheme fell within the stat-
ute and thus was a lottery the court looked to the
motivating factors inducing appellees to deal with
Universal. The court found that the evidence
showed Universal's sales and promotional tech-
niques were aimed at creating a desire to be paid
large sums of money for no effort and not at creat-
ing a desire for the product. Apparently this, as
well as the chain letter nature of the promotion,
was considered in deciding whether the statute had
been violated.
Gault Given Only Prospective Effect-Cradle v.
Peyton, 156 S.E.2d 874 (Va., 1967). In 1962, peti-
tioner, age seventeen, was brought before the
juvenile court of Norfolk on charges of armed rob-
bery. He did not appear with counsel nor was he
advised of his constitutional right to have court-
appointed counsel if he could not afford one, a
right extended to juveniles in Application of Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967). The juvenile court waived
jurisdiction and certified petitioner to the general
city court for trial as an adult on both offenses.
Petitioner was subsequently convicted and sought
a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he was
denied his constitutional right to counsel at the
juvenile court hearing. The Corporation Court of
the City of Norfolk denied the petition and on
appeal this decision was affirmed.
The major issue before the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia was whether the rights afforded
juveniles in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966), and Gault applied to certification hearings
which occurred prior to these decisions. Justice
Gordon, writing for a majority of the court, based
his decision on two grounds. First, a certification
order differs significantly from a confinement order.
The Virginia juvenile court made no finding of
petitioner's innocence or guilt, only a finding that
he should stand trial on the merits in another court.
Kent dealt with a certification order but the Court
limited its decision to a statutory, rather than con-
stitutional, basis. Second, after an examination of
this case in the light of the policy criteria used to
determine retroactivity in Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967), the court concluded that Gault
should be given only prospective effect. justice
Gordon decided that the prupose of the new rules
had been met in this instance and the disruptive
effect of retroactive application would be great.
Thus, certain irregularities in admitting the con-
fession and in giving notice and the right to counsel
were not reversible error here, even though they
would be under Gault. Nor did the Virginia Con-
stitution or statutes support petitioner's position.
Relief was therefore denied.
Chief justice Eggleston dissented on the ground
that petitioner had been denied his statutory and
constitutional right to have appointed counsel at
the juvenile court hearing. He stated that the
certification hearing was a "critically important"
proceeding, within the scope of Kent, 383 U.S. at
560, which "may result in commitment", within
the meaning of Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
Two judges who concurred in the decision disa-
greed with the majority opinion on the ground that
there was no valid distinction under Gault between
certification and commitment proceedings but that
such a distinction might be taken into considera-
tion in determining whether Gault should be given
retroactive effect.
Comment: The Constitution neither requires
nor prohibits retroactivity as determined in Link-
letter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). The right of a
state to decide this in a post-conviction proceeding
was recognized in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S.
719 (1966), and the criteria for states to use were
provided in Stovall.
Because Gault did not state whether it was to be
retroactive or not, the issue has confronted several
courts. None have felt they could avoid the issue
by relying solely on the distinction between a certi-
fication or waiver (of jurisdiction) proceeding and
a commitment proceeding since the juvenile court
could not know before the hearing whether it would
retain jurisdiction or not. State v. Acuna, 428 P.2d
660 (N.M., 1967), and State v. Hance, 233 A.2d 329
(Md., 1967), have agreed with the Virginia court in
Cradle. Arizona, on the other hand, even though
critical of Gault has felt compelled to follow it in
this situation in Application of Billie, 429 P.2d 699
(Ariz., 1967). The reasoning behind the Arizona
court's decision is that unlike the cases construed
in Johnson, Gault was a habeas corpus proceeding.
These subsequent cases therefore come before the
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courts in the same procedural context as Gault and
cannot be distinguished from it. Thus, a habeas
corpus decision must automatically have retroac-
tive effect. Such a possibility was not considered in
Cradle, Acuna, or Hance.
Procedures Which Prevent An Accused From
Presenting His Witnesses Because Of His Pov-
erty Are Unconstitutional-Whittington v. Gaither,
272 F.Supp. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1967). The petitioner,
an indigent, was convicted of armed robbery. His
motion for a new trial, appeal, motions for rehear-
ing, and a petition for habeas corpus were all un-
successful. He then brought a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the district court alleging that the
Texas post-conviction remedies were a denial of due
process since they denied him an opportunity to
present his defense.
The petitioner alleged that he knew of the
existence of two witnesses who would testify that
they had registered him at their motel on the night
of the crime. Since Texas neither provided for
release on personal recognizance nor paid for the
expenses of out of state witnesses, there was no way
that the indigent could prepare his defense and
bring his witnesses to the trial. The court ruled
that procedures that failed to give a defendant a
complete opportunity to present his defense vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause. The court also held that since funds for
presenting the defense were not available to the
petitioner's attorney either from the petitioner or
from the state, the petitioner was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
Abusive Remarks By Solicitor Forbidden-
State v. Miller, 157 S.E.2d 335 (N.C. 1967). The
defendants were convicted of breaking and enter-
ing. During the course of the trial, the solicitor
made several remarks defiling the character of the
defendants, made uncomplimentary comments
concerning the defense counsel, and made argu-
ments to the jury that certain witnesses were liars.
The court reversed the convictions because of the
grossly unfair and prejudicial arguments of the
solicitor. The court held these remarks were cal-
culated to mislead and prejudice the jury, because
there was no supporting evidence in the record to
justify his abusive remarks. Defendants in crimi-
nal prosecutions should be convicted upon evidence
in the case, and not upon prejudice created by
abuse administered by the solicitor.
The court said arguments to the jury should be
fair and based on evidence properly inferred from
the record. The counsel should not indulge in vul-
garities, and should refrain from abusive, vitupera-
tive, and approbrious language, which are orily
calculated to cause prejudice.
The court also held that it was error for the trial
court not to forbid the grossly unfair and improper
arguments of the solicitor. It is the duty of the
judge to interfere when the remarks of counsel are
not warranted by the evidence, and are calculated
to mislead or prejudice the jury. The court felt to
affirm the conviction would be a manifest injustice
to the defendants' right to a fair and impartial trial.
Failure To Appeal Because Of Counsel's Mis-
take Not Waiver-Robinson v. Myers, 233 A.2d 220
(Pa. 1967). Robinson appealed from a denial of a
habeas corpus petition on the grounds that his
failure to perfect an appeal from a conviction of
voluntary manslaughter resulted from an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of counsel. The record
indicated that counsel for the convicted were satis-
fied by the verdict, although the convicted still
protested that his act was not a crime. Addition-
ally, counsel actively discouraged the appellant
from appealing. Their advice was based on an
erroneous fear that he might be convicted on re-
trial of murder in the first degree, although in
Pennsylvania conviction of a crime of a lower de-
gree operated as an acquittal of more serious
offenses.
The court ruled that when counsel indicated to
appellant that he could exercise his right to appel-
late review only at the risk of placing his life in
jeopardy again, it could not be said that the appel-
lant intelligently waived his right to appeal.
Border Searches of Body Cavities-Henderson
v. United States, -F.2d- (9th Cir. 1967). This
case involves the validity of a border search of the
appellant's vagina for narcotics. While crossing the
Mexican border into California, the appellant was
recognized and detained by one of the customs
inspectors. He believed that she had been stopped
on a prior occasion for smuggling marijuana and a
small quantity of a dangerous drug. Upon searching
her handbag the inspector found an automobile
registration slip issued to a known narcotics ped-
dler who had used women to bring his goods across
the border. One of the female inspectors then con-
ducted a strip search. The appellant resisted at-
tempts to have her vagina inspected. Thereupon,
she was compelled to submit to an examination by
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a medical doctor, which resulted in the removal
from her vagina of two rubber packets containing
ninety-three grams of heroin.
The validity of border searches of body cavities
was not questioned. The court stated that "[T]he
only question we decide is whether initiation of the
search was lawful." The government contended
that mere suspicion of smuggling was enough to
permit the search. The appellant, however, con-
tended that the search was unreasonable and
violated the Fourth Amendment.
It had previously been established by a long line
of cases that border searches are unique and do not
require probable cause. Mere suspicion of smug-
gling is enough to initiate a search. See Riras v.
United States, 368 F.2d 703, 709 n.3 (9th Cir. 1966).
The distinction between ordinary searches and
border searches is based upon the fact that the
main purpose of the latter is not to apprehend per-
sons but rather, to seize contraband property
unlawfully imported into the United States. See
The Atlantic, 68 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1933). Thus mere
suspicion alone has been held to be sufficient to
justify such a search for purposes of customs law
enforcement. See Cervantes v. United States, 263
F.2d 800 803, n.5 (9th Cir. 1959).
The Ninth Circuit has recently applied a stricter
test to border searches of body cavities in Rivas v.
California, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966). That case
involved a border search of the appellant's rectum
for contraband. The appellant contended that
"there must be a clear indication of the possession
of narcotics" before a search at a border may be
made. Id. at 710. This test was taken from Schmer-
ber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), which
considered the constitutionality of blood tests in
drunken driving cases. In that case the Supreme
Court stated:
The interest in human dignity and privacy
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects
forbids any such intrusions [beyond the body's
surface] on the mere chance that desired evi-
dence might be obtained. In the absence of a
clear indication that in fact such evidence will
be found, these fundamental human interests
require law officers to suffer the risk that such
evidence may disappear unless there is an im-
mediate search. Id. at 770.
The court in Rivas agreed that the Sdtmerber
test should be applied to border searches of body
cavities. It stated:
[A]n honest "plain indication" that a search
involving an intrusion beyond the body's sur-
face cannot rest on the mere chance that de-
sired evidence may be obtained. Thus we need
not hold the search of any body cavity is justi-
fied merely because it is a border search, and
nothing more. There must be facts creating a
clear indication, or plain suggestion, of the
smuggling. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d
703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966)
The court in Rivas did not consider the fact
that Schmerber dealt with an intrusion beneath
the body's surface rather than with the search of
a body cavity. However, the court in the Henderson
case resolved this distinction. It stated:
[We think that while the language quoted
[from Schmerber] deals specifically with an
invasion, rather than an intrusion on one's
body, its implications are much broader. The
decision emphasizes that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusions of the state. To us this means that
every search must be examined in the light
of the amendment's requirement that it not
be unreasonable and we think that this
requirement applies to border searches.
Thus the court agreed with the appellant that
even border searches must not be unreasonable.
It did not attempt to change the mere suspicion
test in the case of ordinary border searches. How-
ever, in the case of body cavity searches, the right
of the state to keep out contraband had to be
balanced with the right of dignity and privacy of
individuals crossing the border. Thus, the court
concluded that a "clear indication" test would
serve to balance these interests and assure that
border searches of body cavities would be reason-
able.
The court found that the search in Henderson
was not justified. It stated:
[R]ecollection based upon a prior event,
based solely upon physical appearance,
where the means of verification is readily
at hand but not used, and where the incident
recalled did not involve use of a body cavity
did not constitute a dear indication of smug-
gling.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Rivas and Henderson
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has applied a more rigid standard in the case of
body cavity searches than has normally been used
for ordinary border searches. The problem, how-
ever, arises in the application of this standard.
The majority in Henderson concluded that there
was not a clear indication of the crime, whereas the
dissent argued that there was such indication. In
Rivas, the court upheld the search stating that
"[A] previously convicted and registered user of
narcotics, coming across the border under the
influence of narcotics as readily shown by his
eyes, disclosing thirty recent needle marks.., who
acts in an extremely nervous manner may be
searched, as one reasonably portraying a clear
indication he may be smuggling contraband."
Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir.
1966). In the present case the appellant was be-
lieved to have smuggled previously, she carried in
her purse the automobile registration slip of a
known smuggler who used women to carry goods
across the border, and she acted in a nervous
manner, yet this was not deemed a clear indica-
tion of smuggling. Thus the clear indication test
does not appear to be an objective standard which
can be easily defined.
The court in Rivas stated that "while we know
of no acceptable meaning of the term it can be
readily defined." It noted that "indication is
defined as 'an indicating; suggestion.' 'Clear' is
defined as 'free from doubt, free from limitation,
plain.'" However, these are subjective standards,
for what is free from doubt varies from one person
to another. Henderson does not define the term
any further but merely accepts it as set forth in
Rivas.
Schinerber suggests that the determination of
what constitutes a clear indication should be left
to a "neutral and detached magistrate instead of
... an officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of fetering out crime." Schmerber v.
United States, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966). However,
as noted in Rivas, this would be impractical in the
case of border searches. The court stated:
[Als in Schmerber (where the condition of
drunkenness was fast fading away) some
action had to be taken. Appellant could not
be unnecessarily detained without arrest.
He was committing no federal crime in being
under the influence of narcotics.... With
this in mind were the border officers required
to let him pass, and thus allow the possible
entry of contraband into the United States?
We think not. Rivas v. United States, 368
F.2d at 711.
The necessity of giving border guards discretion
as to whether there is a clear indication of smug-
gling makes it even more important to define this
term pragmatically. A court may review the
guards' decision and reverse the conviction if it
finds that the correct standard has not been used.
However, the damage has already been done since
the dignity and privacy of the appellant has been
violated. Furthermore, court action in this manner
may not deter additional unreasonable searches.
The courts apply the exclusionary rule to illegally
seized evidence in the hope that this will deter
the police from further unreasonable searches.
However, the border police are theoretically con-
cerned with intercepting contraband and not with
conviction of the smuggler. Even if a subsequent
conviction is reversed, due to a lack of clear indica-
tion, the border police have already obtained
possession of the contraband. Thus there exists
the possibility of constant harassment of innocent
travelers who are left without redress.
The court in Henderson confuses the matter
even more by stating that failure to verify the
guards belief that the appellant had smuggled in
the past was one of the factors in the finding that
there was no clear indication of smuggling. Assum-
ing there was a readily available means of verifica-
tion, this factor has nothing to do with the question
whether or not the circumstances with which the
guards were faced constituted sufficient grounds
to initiate the search. Verification, of course,
should be required since this will confirm any
suspicion a guard may have and thus in the present
case it is understandable that court considered
the search unreasonable where there was no verifi-
cation. However, this does not solve the general
problem of formulating an objective standard
which can be used in all situations whether or not
verification is involved.
Apart from the problem of defining the clear
indication standard, there exists the question
whether or not this is the correct standard to
apply. As noted above the rationale for not apply-
ing the probable cause test to border searches is
that the main purpose of these searches is the
seizure of contraband and not the apprehension of
criminals. Smugglers, however, are subject to
criminal prosecution and possible imprisonment,
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